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recover back money paid under an award
which already has been spent by a claimant for living expenses." /d.
In Lake, the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals stated that they are not unmindful
of the potential inequities presented by
this appeal. In theory, no one would disagree that funds which are disbursed without ultimate legal vindication should be
recoverable, however, after a lump sum
award is made, it is difficult to justify taking back the money which has already been
used for living expenses. This question
poses a real dilemma and until the legislature addresses these problems, these potential inequities will surely occur again.

- J.

Russell Fentress IV

Anderson v. Bimblich: RECOVERY
OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION
BENEFITS PRECLUDES
RECOVERY IN TORT ACTION
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in A nderson v. Bimblich, 67 Md. App.
612,508 A.2d 1014 (1986), has held that
an employee of a property management
company under contract to the owners of
an apartment building, injured while performing custodial duties under a subcontract with the building owners, and recovers worker's compensation benefits, may
not later pursue a tort action against the
owners if they are deemed "principal contractors," thus constituting a statutory employer within the meaning of the Worker's
Compensation Act (the "Act"), Md. Ann.
Code art. 10 1, § 62 (1985).
On December 10, 1981, appellant Cyril
Anderson suffered serious injuries resulting in the amputation of his right hand
while operating a trash compactor in his
capacity as custodian at the Barbazon
Plaza Apartment complex. At the time
of the accident Anderson was employed
by the Smith-Braedon Property Co.,
("Smithy") pursuant to a contract with the
appellees, Barbazon Plaza Associates (Barbazon), a partnership of which the named
defendant Bimblich was a member. Under
the terms of the contract, Smithy was to
provide property management, custodial,
and maintenance services for the apartment complex. Anderson subsequently
filed for and received worker's compensation benefits for his injury.
Unsatisfied, Anderson proceeded to file
a "third party" suit against Barbazon, alleging negligence in the latter's maintenance of a defective and dangerous trash
compactor on the premises. Anderson's
suit was filed pursuant to § 58 of the Worker's Compensation Act, which provides
that an injured employee who previously
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received benefits under the Act, could also
elect to seek damages against a person
other than the employer for negligence
jointly caused by the employer and some
other third party. See Md. Ann. Code,
art. 101, § 58 (1985).
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, Barbazon filed for, and the trial
judge granted, a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that Barbazon
was Anderson's statutory employer within
the meaning of§ 58 of the Act. Under the
exclusive remedy provisions of§ 15 of the
Act, an employee was barred from suing
his employer to recover damages arising
out of the employer's negligence if the employee previously elected to seek benefits
under the Act. See Md. Ann. Code, art.
101, § 15 (1985). Undeterred, Anderson
appealed.
Presented with a case of first impression,
the court addressed the question of whether
the appellees (Barbazon) were the statutory
employer of Anderson, which if answered
in the affirmative, would bar Anderson's
recovery as a matter oflaw.
The court first determined that the exclusive remedy provisions of § 15 of the
Act barred an employee who had previously
elected to recover worker's compensation
from later suing his employer for tort damages. The court next determined that notwithstanding § 15, an employee could
undertake to sue a person other than the
employer to recover tort damages, so long
as the party sued was not his statutory employer within the meaning of § 62 of the
Act.
To determine whether the appellees in
the instant case were the statutory employers of Anderson, the court relied on
the holding of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Honaker v. W.C. and A.N.
Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 365 A.2d
287 (1976). In considering whether the
employer was a "principal contractor",.
and thus the statutory employer of an employee injured while installing a slate roof,
the Honaker court specified four elements
that must be satisfied to bring an employer
within the scope of§ 62. The four elements
are: (1) a principal contractor; (2) who has
contracted to perform work; (3) which is a
part of his trade, business, or occupation;
and (4) who has contracted with any other
party as a subcontractor for the execution
by or under the subcontractor of the whole
or any part of such work. Anderson, 67
Md. App. at 617,508 A.2d at 1016.
The key determinant under Honaker was
whether the contract between the principal
contractor and the subcontractor arose out
of the original contract between the parties,
or resulted from a contract entered into by
the principal contractor and a third party.

As applied to the case at bar, if the subcontract for custodial services arose out of the
original contract between Barbazon and
Smithy, Barbazon as "principal contractor"
would be designated as the statutory employer of Anderson. However, the Honaker
court cautioned that the preliminary finding was subject to application of the "essential or integral part" test. Under this
test, a finding that the "subcontracted work
is an 'essential or integral' part of the principal contractor's business" is required.
Miller Dev. Co. v. Honaker, 40 Md. App.
185,388 A.2d 562 (1978), a/i'd, 285 Md:
216,401 A.2d 1013 (1979).
In applying the elements of the test set
forth in Honaker to the facts of the case at
bar, the court found that the first two elements were satisfied by evidence contained
in the tenant-lease agreements which clearly
designated Smithy as an agent/landlord of
Barbazon. Additionally, the court found
that a subcontract between Barbazon and
the tenants to provide custodial services
existed because of the landlord's promise,
contained in the leases, to "deliver the
premises and all areas in a clean, safe, and
sanitary condition." Anderson, 67 Md.
App. at 619,508 A.2d at 1017.
The court further held that the third element of Honaker was satisfied by the fact
that the subcontract to provide custodial
services for the benefit of the tenants was
"an essential or integral" part ofBarbazon's
business as apartment owners. Lastly, the
court held that the fourth element was satisfied because the maintenance subcontract
was viewed as being part of the original
property management contract between the
appellees and Smithy, and not the result of
a separate contract between Barbazon and
some other third party, in this case the
tenants themselves.
In holding that apartment owners who
contract with a property management
company to provide custodial services by
way of a subcontract are the "principal
contractors," and thus the statutory employer of a custodian injured during the
course of his employment, the court has
expanded the meaning of statutory employer under § 62 of the Worker's Compensation Act to encompass apartment
building owners. The decision of the court
thus extends the protections inherent in
the Act to apartment building owners who
subcontract for custodial services under
a pre-existing property management contract. Employees injured through the employer's negligence who have previously
elected to seek benefits under § 15 of the
Act, will continue to be precluded from
bringing suit against a statutory employer
as defined under § 62 of the Act.

- Kenneth S. Savell

